Jewish Theological Seminary – University of Jewish Studies, Doctoral School of Jewish religious studies, Budapest
Abstract: In my dissertation, I would like to explore Frigyes Karinthy’s philosophy hidden in his literary work, and to prove that he created a specific independent bourgeois, existentialist philosophy, which is rarely seen in the history of Hungarian philosophic thought. In my research, I use an interdisciplinary method (using philosophy, religious philosophy and literary history), aimed at exploring his cosmogonic conception spanning his entire oeuvre, the ensuing ontological conception of the “dream-life” and “third state of existence”, and his completely new moral system which overwrites the Gospels and at the same time contravenes Nietzsche’s amoral philosophy.
Results: Karinthy sensed well the loneliness of the secularized and, consequently, existentially anxious man with his “throwness” (Geworfenheit), and the weight of existential responsibility lying on the individual.
In his novels, short stories and essays there appears the “responsible man” manifesting himself in his messianic figures. In the present paper, I try to place Karinthy’s “responsible man” alongside the universal philosophical thinking; between Descartes’ modern, thinking, responsible man, and the responsible man of the humanist existentialist philosophy of Sartre and Camus.
The early twentieth century was basically influenced by two great intellectual currents: Nietzschean philosophy and Freudian psychology. Both currents anticipated the postmodern sense of life and way of thinking; the social, psychological and ethical consequences of which have been elaborated upon within Hungarian literature mainly by the “Nyugatosok” (Westerners), as by Karinthy too. That is why I examine how his concept of a “responsible man” was born on the border between the modern and the postmodern.
Conclusions: Karinthy’s idea of a “responsible man” was first formulated in the preface to his play Tomorrow morning (‘Holnap reggel’), written in the eighth month of World War I, in an apocalyptic age. This became completed in the messianic figure of Titusz Telma in his 1916 short novel, The thousand-faced soul (‘Az ezerarcú lélek’). Actually, Karinthy’s Proclamation of Titus Telma (‘Telma Titusz kiáltványa’) belongs closely to this short novel. The Proclamation was published separately by Oszkár Ascher in 1938 as part of Frigyes Karinthy’s unpublished diary and letters (‘Karinthy Frigyes Kiadatlan naplója és levelei’), but until our 2011 edition these two closely related works never appeared together (see “Az ezerarcu lélek – Telma Titusz kiáltványa”/The thousand-faced soul – Proclamation of Titus Telma). Karinthy’s cosmogonic and moral-philosophical message are unfolded in the “points” of the proclamation. The proclamation is a possible, life-affirming, practical response to both the unfeasible, superhuman moral expectations of Jesus, and the position above morality of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which overcomes evil with the courage of the strong good and can bring salvation to the modern and postmodern man who lives in existential fear.
Keywords: responsible man, modern-postmodern, existentialism, moral-philosophy, redemption
I. A philosophical framework of a responsible, modern-postmodern man’s formation
The idea of modern rational man begins with the principle of “Cogito ergo sum” as enunciated by Descartes, who defines his own existence as a function of the self-reflection of thought, which in turn implies doubt or “Dubito ergo sum” as an essential dimension of thought and a basic condition of existence for a free, thus responsible individual.
The Kantian common sense critique of the Enlightenment then undertakes an examination of the structure of human thought to ultimately arrive at the moral-philosophical notion of categorical imperative. This Categorical Imperative creates the need within all human being to become law-makers who are capable in turning the concept of duty into a general law without the expectation of any divine, otherworldly punishment or reward, that is, without the hypotetical imperative of all self-interest. In this way, it establishes the independent responsibility of the secular modern-postmodern man towards the world, and it will serve as the basis of a modern democratic society.
This process of secularization which is perceived and formulated and then culminated in Nietzsche's early-existentialist philosophy, which, with its “nihilistic” amoral philosophy, seeks to answer and find a solution to the redemption of the individual who is alone, who is liable for himself. Then the late existentialist Sartre (following Heidegger and Husserl) will go back again to Descartes’ pure cogito. In doing so, he lays the foundation for his humanist existentialist philosophy and closes a whole philosophical circle spanning several centuries.
It is not possible to draw a sharp line between modern and postmodern thinking and the feeling of life; where does the one end and where does the other begin. Surely as we can see this is a process spanning several centuries, and these are still inseparable today, since both conceptions are present.[1] Agnes Heller characterizes the modern approach with universalism, while the postmodern with detotalization.[2]
II. Two great forerunners of the postmodern
The foundation of the postmodern is connected to the philosophy of Nietzsche and the psychology of Freud, respectively in the literature,[3] the two very influential thinkers who have largely defined the way of thinking, worldview, sense of life and art of the twentieth century and even the present day.
II.1. Nietzsche’s language-based proto-postmodernism
Nietzsche’s proto-postmodernism is derived from a linguistic approach in which Descartes’ proposition regarding the possibility of rational cognition – a precondition of which is the reliability of language – is called into question. What Nietzsche’s proto-postmodernism actually calls into question is the implication of Descartes’ proposition that the possibility of rational cognition and therefore language is in fact capable of grasping all of life’s realities. Grammar and semantics, forcing a form onto internal and external chaotic processes, schematize them. ‘The grammar seems absolute, but in essence it creates spiritual-metaphysical concepts and ideas.’[4] Thus Nietzsche considers the concept of God a grammatical error, a piece of misleading language, since man starts from that grammatical order ‘that if something, which exists, has been created, there must also have to be a creator.’[5] That is, he simply attributes faith in the existence of God to a deceptive system of language. Quoting his successful expression: “‘Reason’ in language – oh, what an old deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.”[6] Nietzsche likewise disputes the concept of cogito by Descartes, namely itself the concept of the thinking self. It could be said, instead of the Cartesian “I think, therefore I am” statement, Nietzsche introduces the thesis ‘I think, therefore I deceive’[7], because according to him man can grasp things only in metaphors.[8] With the undertaking of chaos, nihilism typically arrives at a hermeneutical solution rather than at a grammar one, exploring a kind of metahermeneutics, examining the antecedents of ‘building order into chaos’[9]. According to Nietzsche, we can never achieve the truth because the truth does not exist, but it is ‘something to be created’, it requires will to power which is beyond language. Accordingly, he considers philology the “art of correct reading”.[10] Nietzsche's conception of language was later developed by the rhetorical trend of postmodern literary studies, the deconstruction. Antal Bókay considers Nietzsche one of the proto-sources of the postmodern trend.[11]
II.2. Freud’s psychoanalytic proto-postmodernism
While Nietzsche in a theoretical-philosophical way exceeded the modern Cartesian ways of thinking, subsequenty Freud exceeded them in terms of practical life. After he noticed non-physical origin symptoms in hysterical patients, he explored a grammatical-semantic mechanism, namely, that the human psyche divides both the external and internal worlds into signifiers and signifieds. Freud thought it was enough to reveal the secrets of this language mechanism for healing. The only means of this was language, the conversation.[12] During his psychoanalytic therapy, he was confronted with the fact that internal signifier-signified form an infinite chain, that is, behind every previous trauma, another one can be discovered, so the therapeutic process is unfinishable and unclosable.[13] It proves that the person has no stable nucleus, no endpoint, since another endpoint emerges behind every point that is believed to be an endpoint. ‘This incompleteness is the postmodern starting point of psychoanalysis, sithence it considers the aspiration towards the unified person, the final, clear meaning and the reliable grammar an illusion.’[14]
In his work the Interpretation of dreams (‘Die Traumdeutung’), published in 1900, he introduced a hermeneutic model, thus he gave birth to the method of psychoanalysis. As a variant of the postmodern semantic concept, in the depths of the soul he assumed a set of fragments of unknown origin, faulty fragments of the soul.[15] ‘...he claims that these fragments are signs of the emergence and existence of a unified force, a complex of desire. Freud called this united force the unconscious.’[16] ‘The unconscious, the desire is found behind everything rational... ’[17] In contrast to the Cartesian “I think, therefore I am” Freud considers the principle of ‘I desire, therefore I am’[18] to be well-founded. Freud's ‘unconscious and associated spiritual mechanisms play the same life position and theoretical role’ as Nietzsche’s will to power.[19] ‘Desire (…) is a continous compulsion to interpret, and the life of the individual man, thus, is an existence-hermeneutic, a series of interpretations of desire.’[20] Unsatisfied desire can cause mental illness during the spiritual activity of repression. In psychoanalytic dialogue (language-creating), dream-interpretation therapy, looking behind the repressed and rational self-deception to the genealogical starting point of desire, provides an opportunity to recreate the inner intellect, which is not or less pathogenic. This process can be called also self-creating hermeneutics. The very postmodern content of psychoanalysis, to capture the desire that evokes (covering) rhetoric, whereas it is essentially impossible to grasp it, since the signified always turns out to be in fact a signifier and needs further understanding. Thus, the personality dissolves and disperses; its existence is temporalized.[21]
Freud in his book The Future of an Illusion (‘Die Zukunft einer Illusion’ 1927) sees the concept of God as the articulation of anxiety, fear and guilt in the image of the primal father, and then in the elevation of the image of the primal father to a concept of God.[22] ‘God, in the Freudian system, is an interpretation of a desire, namely a dialogic interpretation, for, the anxiety inherent in each man has received an illusory but reassuring signifier on the basis of a common agreement and dialogue.’[23]
Nietzsche’s and Freud’s linguistic, hermeneutical conception already anticipates the postmodern concept of meaning, but its principles will be worked out only by Heidegger and Derrida, on the basis of their formulation and in retrospect from the postmodern age, they can be considered the forerunners of the postmodern conception.[24]
III. The influence of the Nietzschean philosophy and Freudian psychology on the early twentieth century
As we have seen, the early twentieth century takes place in an atmosphere of influence of the two great intellectual currents, Nietzsche’s philosophy and Freudian psychology. Thus, it naturally influenced the arts, including literary representation and philosophical thinking. Within Hungarian literature, the social, psychological and ethical consequences of both intellectual currents, were processed mostly by the “Nyugatosok” (Westerners) in their works.
Nietzsche was seeking an answer to the moral crisis of the secularizing society of the 19th century; that is, why the “stone-engraved” Judeo-Christian laws do not function. Moreover, he interpreted the whole history as a refutation of Judeo-Christian moral values, and as a consequence, declared that “God is dead”.[25] Consequently, if God is dead, then his moral laws are no longer valid. With this statement, Nietzsche definitively relieves/deprives man of the protective illusion of divine providence, at the same time putting a divine burden, the responsibility of being, on his shoulders, which, from his philosophical logic, only a superhuman man, the Übermensch, would be able to carry. Even if it is not an Übermensch, an autonomous, secular individuum is created who is responsible for himself, which is a condition of modern-postmodern civil democratic society.
Naturally, this nihilistic world, deprived of metaphysical “reality”, evokes existential anxiety in the individual, and at the same time also detotalizes[26] the world; there is no longer a universal unit which the individuum can hold on to – as we have seen, it is also one of the defining foundations of the postmodern sense of life. This anxious sense of life and sense of responsibility provoked different responses in sensitive thinkers and artists, in both philosophy and literature. In this sense, we can speak about post-Nietzsche philosophy and literature.
This is the existential problem wherein Karinthy also looks for an answer, and creates the concept of the “responsible man” as a counterweight of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, otherwise he identified himself with “responsible man” concept in his life.[27]
IV. Collocation of Karinthy’s concept of “responsible man” between the Cartesian and the late existentialist philosophical thinking
Sartre in his study The Cartesian Freedom (‘La Liberté cartésienne’ 1946) writes: Descartes’ “spontaneous reaction is to affirm the responsipility of man in the presence of the true. Truth is a human thing, since I must affirm it in order for it exist. (...) Man is thus the being through whom truth appears in the world. His task is to commit himself totally in order that the natural order of existants may become an order of truths. He must ponder the world, must will his thinking and must transform the order of being into a system of ideas. (...) Descartes therefore begins by providing us with entire intellectual responsibility.”[28]
Or, as in Being and Nothingness (‘L’être et le néant’ 1943) he previously stated: “...man, doomed to be free, carries the weight of the whole world on his shoulders: he is responsible for the world and for himself as a way of being. ”[29]
So the individuum which is responsible for the order of the world is formulated here, dating back to the pure Descartes origin of mature existentialism. Karinthy's notion of “responsible man” fits into this system of thought, beyond that, we will see, it may also meet certain criteria of the Jewish concept of redemption.
IV.1. Presentation of Karinthy’s Tomorrow Morning (‘Holnap reggel’1916) play in terms of a prototype of the “experimental man” (savior)
In the preface of his play Tomorrow Morning, Karinthy articulates the role of the “responsible man”. This work was written in the eighth month of World War I, in an apocalyptic era, and the question was conceived in the atmosphere of the need for redemption: „Ki verte belém, hogy nekem kell megoldani a csomókat – hogy én vagyok a felelős az életért, melyért senki sem vállalja a felelősséget?” (‘Who beat into me that I have to solve the knots – that I am responsible for life, for which no one takes responsibility?’)[30] A person who consciously takes responsibility for being – the autonomous, civic individuum – in his freedom the capability of redemption also lies. As a result, the responsible men of Karinthy simultaneously act the part of saviors.
The protagonist of Tomorrow Morning, Sándor Ember (Alexander Man), is the prototype of the “experimental savior” – as Karinthy composes in his preface:
„… De én a törvényre vagyok kíváncsi, nem arra mi az ember, hanem arra, hogy mi l e h e t -n e ... mi felé é r d e m e s törekedni. Azt az embert akarom látni, akit az értelem és belátás teremtett volna a hatodik napon – ahelyett, akit a véletlen teremtett. A kísérleti embert, a homunkuluszt akarom látni…”
(‘… But I’m curious about the law, not about what the man is, but what he m i g h t b e ... what it’s w o r t h striving f o r.[31] I want to see that man who was created by reason and discernment on the sixth day – instead of the one created by chance. I want to see the experimental man, the homunculus…’)[32] – who will be completed in the form of Titus Telma, the protagonist of The thousand-faced soul (‘Az ezerarcu lélek’ 1916)[33].
Already Sándor Ember is also a kind of Übermensch, at the same time he is the opposite of Zarathustra – as Márton Karinthy also assumes in his book Devil Spasm (‘Ördöggörcs’ 2003). Freed from the fear of death of the existentially anxious man, Sándor Ember will be able to avoid his tragic fate, that is, to reverse the ordinarily sad end of the tragicomedy,[34] and converting the aircraft intended for killing and destruction into a peaceful instrument, saying no to war, to murder, he is elevated into a superhuman redemptive figure, to the experimental man, the homunculus, whom Karinthy was looking for.
IV.2. The thousand-faced soul short novel’s mature redemtive figure/responsible man
Karinthy’s much more mature redemptive figure, his “responsible man” (although only two years separate the creation of the two works), is completed in the person of the protagonist of The thousand-faced soul, Titus Telma. The short novel was published in 1916 and occupied Karinthy for the rest of his life. Thus the Proclamation of Titus Telma (‘Telma Titusz kiáltványa’), which is an integral part of the novel, was ‘kneaded and carved into himself’[35] until his death, and which, as his masterpiece, he would have liked to expand into a proclamation novel.[36]
The proclamation was edited by Oszkár Ascher from Karinthy’s manuscripts which were created in different times,[37] and it was published in 1938 as part of the Frigyes Karinthy’s unpublished diary and letters (‘Karinthy Frigyes Kiadatlan naplója és levelei’), after the writer's death.[38] While the novel was published several times, the proclamation was undeservedly forgotten and was published only in 2011 already as an integral part of the novel.[39]
The co-publication of the two works is also very important from the aspect of Karinthy's oeuvre because it contains the author's most important moral-philosophical message to the world against Nietzsche’s immoral, “nihilistic” philosophy, but it also presents for us a complex existential-philosophical, and at the same time redemptive, idea.
As described above, I analysed in detail both the short novel and the proclamation, and therefore now I aim to summarise the philosophical content. Firstly I will describe the short novel’s history.
The thousand-faced soul was written against the apocalyptic background of World War I, and is set in this time. Titus Telma is a 30-33 year old[40] (like Jesus or Zarthustra) Jewish naturalist (doctor of physiology) from the Hague, who discovers the secret of immortality, and by leaving his own body his soul is able to reincarnate in other organic or inorganic bodies as well. With this superhuman ability, he acquires redemptive power, since he can kill anyone with impunity, but he cannot be slain by any son of man. He could misuse this ability, but his redeeming essence is realized precisely in the fact that he seeks worldly redemption as an active good person. He appears in the body of an already shot corporal at the battle of Kolm, and causes astonishment, then a laughing hysteria, among the soldiers who cannot kill him. This is Titus Telma’s messianic, apokalyptic break-in to history. It satisfies certain Jewish messianic criteria.[41]
Doctors diagnose telmamania, or telmaism, as the mass hysteria that this scene triggers among people. Then on the anniversary of the Lutherian proclamation put on the wall of Wittenberg Cathedral, Titusz Telma sets his own proclamation at the gates of the London Parliament. So, as we can see, the proclamation appears as an immanent part of the novel, although at that time the writer was probably just beginning to work out the text of the proclamation, sithence we do not know its points here, we only know up to a brief reference that it is ‘about the rights of a man born free’[42].
In the novel’s proclamation, Telma calls on governments around the world to hold a conference in Antwerp and at the same time he reveals his own superhuman power, and calls on those who unjustly usurp power to resign, otherwise – in accordance with the active messianic criteria – he slays them.[43]
Titus Telma eventually, as an active messiah on the scene of history, reaches general disarmament, the destruction of weapons and world peace. And by doing so, he seems to fulfill his redemptive mission. Although in the last chapter of the novel the possibility of redemption remains doubtful, since, from the letters of Telma to his love, we incidentally find out, that the world arms again. As an ironic twist that is so characteristic of Karinthy, finally, Telma (who is now in the body of Marquis Mesquin) due to his hopeless love for the woman, decides to dissolve his soul and leave living people. József Kurt, as Telma’s apostle, reports that he will be expected to return as a redeemer.
This is the story of the novel in a nutshell, and the text of a proclamation compiled by Oscar Ascher and separately published 22 years later is built on this story.
4.3. Cosmogonic, moral-philosophical and ontological aspects of Proclamation of Titus Telma
The introductory part of Proclamation of Titus Telma (I. The Legend) refers back to the legend, that is, to the events of the novel. And the proclamation, ‘from a researcher who does not want to name himself’[44], presents the “Gospel of József Kurt” to the publisher who published it. The writer would like to suggest, as if the expected “parousia” had occurred; that is, Titus Telma again would have reappeared among the people, again to bring that good news, the “new Gospel”.
Like Nietzsche, who called his Zarathustra the “fifth Gospel”, Karinthy also intended his proclamation to be a “new Gospel”, whose language, biblical parallelisms – as in the case of Zarathustra – evoke the Gospels. For Karinthy and Nietzsche, this is a conscious reference to the withdrawal of the original Gospels in their own form, or to reform them. Karinthy, however, does it for a dual purpose; he writes his own ‘Gospel’ also as a withdrawal of Nietzsche's Zarathustra.
In accordance with the “new Gospel”, the believers of Telma introduce a new era[45] (just like Nietzsche in The Antichrist[46]). Karinthy founds his new religion, “telmaism”, with an unprecedented theological sense, in which religion, as we shall see, is filled with a new moral content compared to the original Gospels. In keeping with the new religion, he also composes a new history of creation that reveals a complex cosmogonic system.
In the next chapter of the proclamation (§ I. / 1. The horror) (‘A rémület’) his history of creation unfolds, and with it itself the proclamation begins (that is why there is also the indication I. §/1. here, in which Karinthy was later inconsistent).
„Kezdetben volt a köd és a káosz és ebben a ködben és káoszban aludt a Bátorság. Egyszer pedig felébredt, nyujtózkodott, mint az ébredő, még álmos lélek kiált, mikor jókedvűen magához tér. (…) A köd pedig megrémült ekkor és reszketni kezdett egész mivoltában…”
(‘In the beginning there was fog and chaos and in this fog and chaos the Courage slept. And he once woke up, stretched himself, like an awakener, still sleepy soul who is crying out, when he is regaining consciousness cheerfully. And (…) the mist was horrified then, and it began to tremble in his whole being…’)[47]
The cosmos is organized into matter from this “original Horror”; solar systems are formed, Earth is formed, life is formed on Earth, and one day Man, the “son of trembling Horror” is formed.[48]
To understand this cosmogonic beginning, we need to know Karinthy’s ontological idea, which he explicates in many of his works, e.g.: Is there an afterlife? (‘Van-e túlvilági élet?’), Everything is different (‘Minden másképpen van’), foreword of Tomorrow morning (‘Holnap reggel’), foreword of Heavenly Report[49] (‘Mennyei Riport’), Rope dance (‘Kötéltánc’), The bad dream (‘A rossz álom’) etc.
The influence of Freudian psychology may also have contributed to his idea of syncretist and multi-philosophical views, according to which:
„… van egy é b r e n l é t, amelyhez viszonyítva eszmélő életünk annyi csak, mint mostani életünkhöz képest az álom…”
(‘...there is a wakefulness with relation to which our conscious life is as much as the dream compared to our present life…’)[50].
According to Karinthy, one can wake up from this “dream life”, only with a spiritual movement contrary to its dream logic’, e.g. you can wake up with an inarticulate cry or laugh to “true reality”, that is, he thinks of a kind of awakening after death, which is neither life as we know it nor death, but something beyond that, a “third state”, an individual afterlife that is a reality which always coexists with the dream life.
The awakening Courage, the metaphysical deity, in the creation history of the proclamation, is in fact nothing more than the inner self-god of a person who exists somewhere in Gnostic distance. This inner self-god dreams/creates the person’s dream self (dual conception of the soul)[51], and his life, dream reality. The protagonist of the Heavenly Report (written much later), Merlin Oldtime, will then reach this god of metaphysical Courage during his afterlife journey. Karinthy’s idea of a self-god is actually a transcendental ego, but certainly not in the Husserl or Sartre sense. At the same time, Karinthy’s inner self-image can be explained by the mechanism of Sartre’s conscious self-reflection.
If we try to interpret the god of Courage from this particular theological logic, then it can also be understood as the self-creating inner god of Titus Telma, who will redeem the world he has created from “original Horror”.
So the Courage, via his shouting (his logos), he necessarily creates a cosmos of Horror that is independent of him. From here, as a Gnostic deity, he no longer participates in creation, but the Horror, as a demiurge, further creates the trembling world of matter. In it Man the “trembling son of Horror”[52] builds walls around himself and makes weapons because he is afraid of his fellow man, the life of the other man, not of death, but from “killability” (as Karinthy coined), and even in this fear he will kill and wage war.
Karinthy accurately senses the existential fear and anxiety felt by the lonely, modern-postmodern, secularizing bourgeois individual (as in Kafka’s works, just using other writing tools) and builds his cosmogony from this existential fear; the creation theory of the cosmos of Horror. But he won’t let it go unanswered, and as the final conclusion of moral philosophy follows logically from all cosmogony, thus, in the case of Karinthy, as a philosophical-logical consequence, he builds the moral system of the brave good, the strong good, thus overwriting Nietzsche’s amoral philosophy.[53]
Titus Telma kills the cause of fear in himself, the fear from the killability, thus he acquires the superhuman immortality and redemptive power.[54] He makes a proclamation to the people evoking the Sermon on the mount of Gospel to the killable mortals, as he calls them:
„A Boldogság neve: megismerés.
Megmondatott: mondj igazat, betörik a fejed.
És megmondatott: töresd be a fejed és mondj igazat.
Én pedig azt mondom: betört fej nem mond igazat.
S a fejben, mely nem fél a betöréstől, nem az igazság lakozik, hanem a legyőzött félelem holtteteme, melyet úgy neveztek eddig: Bátorság.
A vértanú, ki meghalt az eszméért, vérével vörösre festi azt, s aki azért fogadja be az eszmét, mert vér tapad hozzá, a vért fogadta be és nem az eszmét.
Megmondatott: szeresd ellenségedet, mint felebarátodat, jó légy ahhoz, aki rosszat tesz veled s ha szíved felé sujt, tárd ki melledet.
Én pedig azt mondom: ha az ellenség megöl téged s te hagyod – meg fogja ölni felebarátodat is: bizony mondom neked, az ő kezével, amit nem fogtál le, te ölted meg a te felebarátodat.
Mert kétféle módon támad fel az emberben ama Félelem: az egyik elhalványul a vértől, mely az eszméhez tapad, a másik vérszemet kap tőle.
Azért hát én, ki nem eltörölni jöttem a törvényt, hanem betölteni, azt mondom:
Szeresd ellenségedet, de gyűlöld, aki nem szereti.
Bocsáss meg mindenkinek, de ne bocsáss meg annak, aki meg nem bocsát.
Érts meg mindenkit, de ne értsd meg azt, aki meg nem ért.
Tégy jót mindenkivel, de rosszat tégy azzal, aki nem tesz jót.
Ezt mondta Telma Titusz azon a reggelen, mikor megtudta, hogy őt nem lehet megölni.”
(‘The name of Happiness: cognition.
It was said: tell the truth, your head will be broken.
And It was said, allow your head to be broken doth, and tell the truth.
But I say, a broken head speaketh no truth.[55]
And in the mind, which is not afraid of the breaking, the truth does not reside, but the corpse of overcome fear, which has hitherto been called: Courage.
The martyr, who died for the idea, painted it red with his blood, and who received the idea because blood had soaked into it, received the blood and not the idea.
It was said: you shall love your enemy as your neighbor, be good to that one who does evil to you, and if he strikes at your heart, open up your chest.
But I say: if the enemy kills you and you let it – he will also kill your neighbor: For truly I tell you: with his hand that you have not taken, you have killed your neighbor.
Because that fear arises in man in two ways: one fades from the blood that seaks into idea, the other becomes bold from it.
So I, who have come not to abolish the law but to fulfill it, I say:
Love your enemy, but hate those who does not love him.
Forgive everyone, but do not forgive those who does not forgive.
Understand everyone, but do not understand those who do not understand you.
Do good to everyone, but do bad to those who do no good.
This is what Titus Telma said that morning when he learned that he could not be killed.’)[56]
As we can see, Karinthy overwrites the laws of Jesus, which have so far proved unenforceable, transforming them into life-affirming, practical moral laws, by which the courage of the strong good can overcome evil, and can bring redemption to the people who live in fear.
This is not the end of Titus Telma’s redemption program; he speaks to the living people and teaches them how to be good:
„Először hozzátok szólok: mindannyiatokhoz s csak aztán azokhoz, akik közületek hatalmasok: nektek mondom el, kicsoda Telma Titusz.
Élő emberek a földön: eddig úgy hívtak benneteket: halandók. Én úgy hívlak benneteket: megölhetők.
Benneteket kik elsápadtok a vértől és benneteket, akik vérszemet kaptok tőle.
Megmondatott nektek a ti bölcseitektől, hogy a haláltól féltek s azért neveztétek el magatokat halandóknak.
Én pedig azt mondom nektek: nem a haláltól féltek ti, hanem egymástól: az Időelőtti Haláltól, amit úgy hívnak: ölés.
Mert a halált adta nektek ugyanaz, aki a Születést adta – a világ istene, kinek neve Bátorság.
Aki pedig születni akar, ha ideje elérkezett s megszületik, mert jó élni – az meghalni is akar, s meghal, ha ideje elérkezett, mert jó meghalni.
Mert két boldogság vagyon: felébredni a kipihentnek és elaludni az elfáradottnak.
De két gyötrelem is van: felébredni a fáradottnak és elaludni a kipihentnek.
Aki tehát idő előtt születik, annak elvetélték az életét – aki idő előtt hal meg, annak elvetélték a halálát, – az elvetélt haláltól féltek ti, megölhetők, nem a haláltól, ti halandók.
Ezt mondja nektek Telma Titusz, a megölhetetlen halandó, ama Bátorság gyermeke.”
(‘I speak to you first: to all of you and only then to those who are powerful among you: I will tell you who Titus Telma is.
Living people on earth: so far you have been called mortals. I call you: killable.
You who are pale from the blood and you who become bold from it.
It was said to you by your wise men that you feared death, and that is why you called yourselves mortals.
But I say to you: you are not afraid of death, but of each other: from Untimely Death, which is called: killing.
Death is given to you by the same one who gave Birth – the god of the world whose name is Courage.
And in turn who wants to be born, when his time came and he was born, because it is good to live – that one also wants to die, and he dies when his time comes, because it is good to die.
Because there are two tipes of joy: waking to the rested and falling asleep to the tired.
But there are two torments: waking to the tired and falling asleep to the rested.
So who was born untimely their life was aborted – who die untimely, their death was aborted – you are afraid of the aborted death, you who are killable, not from death, you, mortals.
This is what Titus Telma, the unkillable mortal, the child of that Courage, tells you.’)[57]
This gives a precise definition of the cause of the fear, thus it also creates for humans, if not immortality, but the possibility of redemption from killability. He provides tangible practical guidance for this:
„Mert amíg a jó meg nem félemlíti a rosszat: az ő neve Gyengeség.”
(‘For as long as the good does not intimidate the evil: its name is Weakness.’)[58]
Accordingly, his main message is: „Ne féljetek.” (‘Do not be afraid.’)[59]
In fact, this is the essence of Karinthy’s moral-philosophical message. But in his proclamation he also speaks To the Mighty Ones of the Earth, against whom he acts as a Platonic statesman, and takes control of the world from them. Finally he addresses his words To the thinkers, who would have to control this world, and bestows his world-governing power upon them, if he will not be once, sithence the redeemed world no longer needs the presence of the redeemer. The absolute freedom of Titus Telma lies in the fact that he is not a prisoner of immortality, but he can decide for himself how long he is present in the world.[60]
IV.4. The significance of Karinthy’s moral-philosophical message
In his essay Nihilism and History (‘Nihilisme et histoire’ 1951), Albert Camus criticizes the nihilism of Nietzsche’s ammoral philosophy, which eventually confined the human to the ‘crime prisons’ of the concentration camps, when the rightful metaphysical rebellion accuses God of the injustice of death and suffering, and then replaces it with the rebellion against rebellion, and the will of theoretical power with the will of secular power.
“Man, on an earth that he knows is henceforth solitary, is going to add, to irrational crimes, the crimes of reason that are bent on the triumph of man. To the ‘I rebel, therefore we exist,’ he adds, with prodigious plans in mind which even include the death of rebellion: ‘And we are alone.’”[61]
The importance of Karinthy’s moral-philosophical message can be truly understood from this humanist existentialist stance. Maybe if he hadn’t (only) created in Hungarian, but in a world language, then his successful response to nihilism could have saved humanity from its destructive ownself!
V. Karinthy’s identification with the role of “responsible man”
Karinthy’s deep identification with the role of “responsible man becomes clear”, in his poem To the reform generation. An extemporaneous account of the talent entrusted to the poet (‘A reformnemzedékhez. Hevenyészett elszámolás a költőre bízott talentomról’)[62] when Titus Telma calls for his mission as a redeemer to hold himself to account.
„…Dallam amit te is el fogsz énekelni a létra tetején törtető ifjú barátom
És végre emitt ez a tőr az én haragom s a dac fente élesre neked
Az én fegyverem vedd a kezedbe markolatát próbáld csak ki ne félj
Szegezd a szívemnek toppants egyet és döfd előre ha mered
Ez az egyetlen tőr amitől elesem a magamé a tiéd még tompa fiacskám
Így döfsz te és így döfök én de viszont így élsz te és így halok én meg
Mert bár én álmodtam őt de önmagam nem vagyok Telma Titusz
S mert nem vagyok az talán jobb is hogy nem szóltatok nekem gyerekek
Lám a harci dalt amit írtam magam már nem szívesen dalolom
Csak az hős aki pőre a páncéllovag fél hogy Achilles-sarkát hátrakötik
Van mit vesztenie hetyke tivornyán és hirtelen jelszavakon
Béke és harc veletek formáljátok és gyúrjátok át ezt a világot
Amit magam már megpróbáltam formálni és gyúrni egy keveset”
(‘...Melody what you are going to sing on top of the ladder my pushy young friend
And finally here this dagger is my anger and the defiance sharpened it for you
It is my weapon take its handle in your hand just try don’t be afraid
Aim it at my heart plant your feet and stab if you dare
Only this dagger that makes me fall is mine yours is still blunt sonny
This is how you stab and this is how I stab but that is how you live and that is how I die
Because even though he was dreamed by me but I am not Titus Telma myself
And because I am not him maybe it is better you didn’t tell me kids
Lo the battle-song I wrote I am not singing it already myself gladly
Only that is a hero who is naked the armored knight is afraid that his Achilles heel will be tied back
There is something he can lose in a jaunty binge and on sudden catchwords
Peace and struggle with you, remould and knead this world
What I myself already have tried to shape and knead a little’)[63]
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Beáta Bacsó doctoral student
OR-ZSE – Jewish Theological Seminary – University of Jewish Studies, Doctoral School of Jewish religious studies
Tutors: Gyula Rugási, Dr. habil., OR-ZSE – Jewish Theological Seminary – University of Jewish Studies, Doctoral School of Jewish religious studies,
Tamás Lichtmann, Prof. emer. dr. habil., OR-ZSE – Jewish Theological Seminary – University of Jewish Studies, Doctoral School of Jewish religious studies
Reviewer: Szilvia Peremiczky, dr. habil., OR-ZSE – Jewish Theological Seminary – University of Jewish Studies, Doctoral School of Jewish religious studies
Acknowledgement: I would like to take the opportunity to thank Tom Couldrey, a language teacher at the London School of English, for improving the English language of my paper.
[1] Cf. Heller 2003. 3-15.
[2] Ibid.
[3] See Bókay 2001.
[4] Op. cit. p. 266., Cf. Schrift 1990. pp. 139-142.
[5] Ibid. Cf. Schrift 1990. pp. 140-142. “Mankind has at all times mistaken the active for the passive: it is its eternal grammatical blunder.” (Nietzsche 1911. par. 120.) Emphasis added
[6] Ibid. / “...Nietzsche’s cryptic remark in Twilight”( Schrift 1990. p. 142.) See Nietzsche 1895. par. 5.
[7] Bókay 2001. p. 267., Cf. Nietzsche 1976.
[8] Cf. Nietzsche 2018. pp. 5-23.
[9] Bókay 2001. p. 267.
[10] Op. cit. p. 269./ Cf. Nietzsche 1878. par. 270., Nietzsche 2005. p.127.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Op. cit. p. 270.
[13] Op. cit. p. 271.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] “Desidero is a fundamental the Freudian Cogito” (Lacan 1981. p. 154.) “‘I think therefore I am’ (in Latin, Cogito ergo sum) was to be replaced by Lacan’s psychoanalytic axiom of the uncertainty of human desire, Desidero ergo sum, ‘I desire therefore I am’” (Levine 2008. 70). Cf. O’Brien 2016. p. 223.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Op. cit. 272.
[21] Op. cit. pp. 273-274.
[22] Cf. „But, as was shown by arguments which I need not repeat here, the primal father was the original image of God, the model on which later generations have shaped the figure of God” (Freud 1961. p. 42.)
[23] Bókay 2001. p. 276.
[24] Ibid.
[25] »Wohin ist Gott?« rief er, » ich will euch es sagen! Wir haben ihn getötet – ihr und ich! Wir alle sind seine Mörder! (…) Gott ist tot! (…)« see the statement of the madman — who, in fact, as a forerunner of Zarathustra, already states, “God is dead!” (it is the oral statement of György Tatár), for “we have killed him” – who is hurt precisely because he dares to tell the truth. See Der tolle Mensch, p. 125. in: Nietzsche 1954. [Emphasis added], see also Nietzsche 2001. pp. 119-120.
[26] Expression by Agnes Heller.
[27] For this Mrs. Kosztolányi is who draws attention: “Némelykor Homérosz, majd meg Szókratész, esetenként Napóleon, de legtöbbször Telma Titusz, a ’megölhetetlen’, a ’megváltó’, ’az ezerarcú’ ember szerepébe élte magát. Szerette hirdetni magáról, hogy ő a ’felelős ember’, s ezt valahogy úgy értette, hogy magára vállalja minden rosszért, minden bűnért a felelősséget.” (‘Sometimes Homer and then Socrates, sometimes Napoleon, but most of the time he played the role of Titus Telma, the “immortal” , the “savior” , the “thousand-faced” man. He liked to declare himself the “responsible man”, and he meant it somehow by taking responsibility for all evil, for all sin.’) (Kosztolányi Dezsőné 2004. 105.)
[28] Sartre 1969. p. 171. Emphasis added
[29] Sartre 1993 p. 553. Emphasis added
[30] Karinthy 1916b. p.13. Emphasis added. All English translations of Karinthy’s work here and elsewhere in the paper are my own. BB
[31] Cf. Sartre
[32] Op. cit. 8.
[33] In other translation: The Protean Soul
[34] “Tragikomédiát írok, de fordítottat. Eddig a tragikomédia eleje vig volt, a vége szomoru. Próbáljuk egyszer ugy, hogy az eleje legyen szomoru és a vége vig.” (‘I write tragicomedy, but conversely. So far, the beginning of the tragicomedy has been merry, the end sad. Let’s try once so that the beginning is sad and the end is happy.’)
(Karinthy 1916b p.11.)
[35] See foreword by Oscar Ascher In: Karinthy 1938b. p. 163./Karinthy 2011. p. 62.
[36] See Necrology of Iván Erdős In: Karinthy 2011. p. 173.
[37] See comment by Oscar Ascher In: Karinthy 1938b. p. 187./Karinthy 2011. p. 86.
[38] Karinthy 1938b.
[39] Karinthy 2011.
[40] He is 33 year old in the novel and 30 in the proclamation (see Karinthy 2011. pp. 15-16., 73.)
[41] Cf. Scholem 1971. pp. 1., 4., 30./ f.n. 25., See also Karinthy 2011. pp. 94-96., 101-102.
[42] See Karinthy 1916a. p. 18./Karinthy 2011. p. 28.
[43] Cf. Karinthy 2011. pp. 102-108.
[44] Karinthy 1938b. p. 163./Karinthy 2011. p. 62.
[45] Karinthy 1916a. p. 3./Karinthy 2011. p. 13.
[46] See Nietzsche 1924. par. 62. p. 181., Cf. Karinthy 2011. pp. 99-102.
[47] Karinthy 1938b. p. 167./Karinthy 2011. p. 66.
[48] Ibid. pp. 167-168./ibid. pp. 66-67.
[49] In other translation: Celestial Riport
[50] Karinthy 1979. p. 333.
[51] „…két részből áll a lelkünk: - az egyik, az abszolút, ami állandóan a túlvilágban van – s a másik, amit innen ismerünk, az életünkből, előbbinek függvénye, relatív valami, mint az álom: – lélek, melynek minden élménye az éber szellem állapotától függ.” (‘...our soul consists of two parts: – one, the absolute, which is constantly in the afterlife – and the other one we know from here, from our lives, is a function of the former, relative something like a dream: – a soul whose every experience depends on the state of the alert spirit.’) (Karinthy 1977. p. 16.)
[52] See Karinthy 1938b. p. 168./ Karinthy 2011. p. 67.
[53] See Karinthy 2011. pp. 118-121.
[54] Cf. Karinthy 1938b. p. 170./Karinthy 2011. p. 69.
[55] The protagonist of the film version of the novel A Journey Round My Skull, written and directed by György Révész in 1970, quotes the second, third and fourth lines with minor changes.
See https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x58qdr7, 05:31-06:01.
The scene in the film is a brilliantly condensed montage of moments from the novel The thousand-faced soul and the Proclamation of Titus Telma. In addition to contemporary recollections and the Karinthy book we published in 2011, also in the essay by Edit Erdődy Worldview and mode of representation in Frigyes Karinthy’s drama Tomorrow Morning (‘Világkép és ábrázolásmód Karinthy Frigyes: Holnap reggel c. drámájában’) refers to the organic connection of the two works. See Erdődy 1990. p. 67.
From 07:21 to 07:28, the film quotes from the Frigyes Karinthy’s unpublished diary and letters (also put in the protagonist’s mouth), that with the theme of Titus Telma is the unkillable man (‘Telma Titusz a megölhetetlen ember’) Karinthy wanted to apply for the French Peace Film Award. Cf. Karinthy 1938a. p. 88.
[56] Karinthy 1938b. pp. 171-172./Karinthy 2011. pp. 70-71. Emphasis added.
[57] Op. cit. pp. 173-174./ Op. cit. pp. 72-73. Emphasis added.
[58] Op. cit. p. 187./ Op. cit. p. 86.
[59] Ibid./Ibid.
[60] See Karinthy 2011. pp. 122-123.
[61] Camus 1991. p. 104.
[62] Karinthy 1938c. p. 51.
[63] Karinthy 1938c. p. 55. Emphasis added. The original appearance of the poem In: Pesti Napló 12. 05. 1935. p. 33. See Kőrizs 2011. ln. 35-36.
Péter György examines the history of the poem’s origin under the Gömbös government (which also gives the apropos of title of the poem), respectively, interpreted the above lines in the historical context of the First World War and the loss of Trianon. See György 2013. pp. 169-173.